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This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES /STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the real estate 
purchase contract was ambiguous in the manner alleged by the buyer, Plaintiff 
Seadhna J. Flores. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness, Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-
59 (Utah 1996), according no particular weight to the trial court construction. 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) It is important to note that 
the trial court made its conclusion on the basis of "uncertain meaning of the 
parties' intent." (R. 101) (emphasis added) However, there was no contention that 
the contract was other than "a fully integrated and binding agreement." (RR. 131-
32, f 11) In such a case, parol evidence is not available "to vary or contradict the 
terms of the writing...." Union Bank v. Swenson, 101 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) 
Therefore, it was error for the trial court to reform an unambiguous contract on this 
basis. These issues were preserved in Defendant's post- and pre-trial briefs (RR. 
090, 053) arguments at trial (TR 162, lines 8-13) and Objections to [Plaintiffs 
Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (RR. 111-13). 
2. Whether the trial court's findings about the parties' intent were clearly 
erroneous. Questions of contractual intent, as determined by extrinsic evidence, 
are questions of fact subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 
Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990) When challenging a district 
court's findings, the challenging party must show that the evidence, viewed in a 
light most favorable to the district court, is legally insufficient to support the 
contested finding. In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^ J45 n.14, 86 P.3d 712 This issue 
was preserved in Defendant's evidence and arguments at trial (TR 167, lines 14-
18, TR 173, lines 22-25, TR 174, lines 1-3) and Second Supplemental Trial Brief 
(R. 090). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff filed this action for specific performance and breach of contract. (R. 
001) The contract in question was a Real Estate Purchase Contract dated May 1, 
2006 (the "REPC") (Addendum A hereto). The REPC concerned the sale of a 
condominium unit in a building that had not been constructed. Plaintiff alleged 
that "on, or about, May 16, 2006, Defendant, in writing, repudiated the [REPC] 
and, since that time, has refused and failed to honor the terms and conditions of 
said contract." (R. 002,15) 
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In his Answer to Complaint (R. 025), Defendant admitted the REPC, but 
denied the claim of repudiation and breach with the allegation that Defendant "has 
consistently stated his intention to abide the REPC [sic]." (R. 026,f5) Defendant 
made the foregoing clear in his Counterclaim: 
1. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to the property with all the build-out 
items listed in Section 1.1 of the REPC. 
2. However, Section 1.1 makes plain that those items are included with 
the sale "if presently owned and attached to the Property." 
3. They are not; the property has not been built. 
4. They will not be built and included with the property unless [P]laintiff 
states his willingness to pay for them, which (so far) he has not. 
5. In fact, [P]laintiff has stated his intention to acquire the property for 
the agreed price with all of the build-out items even though they are 
not required by the REPC.... 
R. 027 
As the Court can see, the dispute centered on Section 1.1 of the REPC: 
Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sales includes 
the following items if presently owned and attached to the Property. 
plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment, ceiling 
fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; 
bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door 
screens; storm doors and windows; garage door opener and 
accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs.... 
Addendum A hereto (emphasis added) 
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It was undisputed that none of the "Included Items" was "presently owned 
and attached to the Property;...." This was because the building did not exist at 
the time the REPC was signed. (R. 083)1 
The case was tried to the bench on September 21, 2007. (R. 076) Plaintiff 
and Defendant were the only witnesses. The trial court received a number of 
exhibits, including the REPC. At the close of the evidence, the trial court heard 
the arguments of counsel. There was a preview of the problems with the trial 
court's decision from its question to Defendant's counsel: 
But I've also understood the law to mean that the Court may, in some 
cases, look at parole evidence to interpret a provision that maybe on 
its face is not ambiguous, but then having looked at it in the light of 
the parole evidence it now is susceptible to read [sic]. Would you 
agree with that? 
TR 162, lines 2-7 (emphasis added) 
The answer of Defendant's counsel was emphatic: "I'm afraid not. I'm 
afraid not. That's not.. .my understanding of the law." (TR 162, lines 8-13)2 
"'Unit No. 402' was yet to be constructed at the time the REPC was signed." 
2
 Which was shown to the trial court in Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiffs Supplemental Trial Brief (R. 053), 
Second Supplemental Trial Brief (R. 090) and Objections to [Plaintiffs Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 109). 
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a built-out unit." (TR 173, lines 22-24) Here was an explicit understand] n<i That 
the parties' - 9*'-\wi did not provide for a "built-out unit." 
make matters worse, there were several indications that the trial court 
c • - .: j ; . o . ;.. •' lo be unambiguous, e.g.; "[I]f I look at [Section] 1.1 all by 
<- 'I • ' )oi it 1:1 ic case \ i id ; 
that, I said to myself on its face, it appears to be unambigi ions It means that they 
he [Plaintiff] gets a roughed in space, and he 's got to pay the rest for all the uum» 
ins, And I think most people would probably agree with that , . , , ," (TR 181, i ;nes 
13 21 ) 
B) tin," a id H iiry.tiniciil, ilk1 ln.il m in i ' s questh\ , uaabeen ;ih^ retined: 
to be attached to, does that create an amhisuM*v<v" i I R ' ^  line^ 8 1 
became the trial court 's ruling: 
i this case, Earnshaw used a REPC that is normally used in the 
sale and purchase of an existing piece of improved real estate. Hence, 
a provision defining items included in the sale "if presently owned 
and attached to the property" clarifies what is usually included in the 
sale. However, Earnshaw used a REPC when no physical structure or 
improved real estate existed. In fact, no discernible street address, as 
referenced in paragraph 1, even existed except,,, perhaps, in a plat in 
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the county recorder's office. Therefore, placing the parties in the 
position they found themselves when they executed the contract, the 
court concludes that paragraph 1.1, referencing items included in the 
sale of the property.. .creates an uncertain meaning of the parties' 
intent, a facial deficiency, and an impression that other terms are 
missing. 
R. 101 (Addendum B hereto) (emphasis in original) 
However, it is clear that the trial court was confusing the concept of contract 
interpretation with integration: "Accordingly, extrinsic evidence is needed to 
ascertain the parties' intent with respect to that issue [whether the REPC required 
conveyance of a fully-built condominium unit] only, not the contract price. 
Otherwise, the court finds that the REPC is fully integrated for the contract price of 
$144,950." (R. 101) (Addendum B hereto) (emphasis added) 
The problem is that the parties never disputed that the REPC was "a fully 
integrated and binding agreement." (R. 131-32, f 11) In fact, they made this one of 
the "Findings" of the trial court. Id. In his Objections, Defendant cited Union 
Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985): "This means that parol evidence is 
inadmissible 4to vary or contradict the terms of the writing once it is determined to 
be an integration.'" (R. I l l quoting 707 P.2d at 665) 
3
 These findings were voluntarily made by Plaintiff after Defendant's Objections (R. 109), which were withdrawn 
when Plaintiff made the changes (R. 114). (The findings are attached as Addendum C hereto.) In case there is any 
question, the Court should consider the integration clause in the REPC (Section 14). (Addendum B hereto) 
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Defendant to ex r1 aim ilie only way for the Court to do what it has done in this 
case is by way of its legal conclusion that the REPC, specifically, 1J1.1, was 
'ambiguous,' However, even that is problematic because the Court's introduction 
of extrinsic e\ idence appears to contradict the ] . mi aiw undmwiguous terms of f 1,, 
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Defendant is arguing that point on appeal. 
From the foregoing, the Court should see another problem with the trial 
court ruling: The trial court limited introduction of extrinsic evidence to that 
single comr^;. ^ n n t n e i n a ; ^OIAI determine u> De ambijuou*- "Accord ., 5^ 
issue "_/.'_ij/, nut Lne con!' • * .: * *^.,r,--0. ernpha^is 
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test*mony w a g S Upp0 r ted by all the undisputed e\ idence: 
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1. Defendant started marketing the project, on the Internet, in "February, 
March [2005] - somewhere around there." (TR 86, lines 24-25, TR 87, lines 1-6) 
2. Defendant was done making changes to the web site within a month 
of the site going live. (TR 148, lines 19-24) 
3. From that time on, the price advertised for Plaintiffs unit was 
"$184,950." (TR 87, lines 21-25, TR line 1) 
4. This was several months before Plaintiff showed an interest in the 
project. (TR 25, lines 2-10) 
5. At that time (December, 2005), Plaintiff was referred to Defendant's 
web site where he could see the price. (TR 28, lines 6-17) 
6. Plaintiff admitted he went to Defendant's web site before buying the 
unit. (TR 28, line 25, TR 29, lines 1-7) 
7. Page four clearly stated: "Unit prices start at $ 184,950." (TR 30, lines 
1-25) (Addendum D hereto) 
8. Plaintiff admitted seeing this page, but denied seeing the "$ 184,950" 
price. (TR 34, lines 19-25, TR 35, lines 1-20) 
9. Defendant testified: "And I know we [Plaintiff and Defendant] talked 
prices, because all of them were the same price. So that's what I started out." (TR 
83, lines 3-4) 
8 
10. Defendant testified: "Right before I started the job, I knew that in 
order to make a profit on there, I had to sale [sic] each unit for such a price so that 
- because I had the expenses of building it. And if I cut all - that's why I was at 
$184,950." (TR 83, lines 17-21) 
11. To be clear, Defendant testified there was no way for him to make a 
profit on the unit at $144,950. (TR 83, lines 22-25, TR 84, lines 1-2) 
12. As a matter of fact, Defendant sold all the small-sized units (8) for a 
minimum of $184,950. (TR 88, lines 18-25, TR 89, lines 4-6) 
13. The only exception was a woman who paid slightly more: $185,000. 
(TR 89, lines 1-3) 
14. There was even a small-sized unit on the floor directly below 
Plaintiff, which was underneath the parking lot, but sold for the same price. (TR 
95, lines 13-23) 
15. Defendant could not remember if Plaintiff was the first to buy a small-
sized unit: "There were so many people coming in,.. ..As soon -just right after I 
put the trailer up and the time [sic], people started calling me." (TR 90, lines 11-
22) 
16. However, the evidence showed that the first such unit was sold to an 
attorney a few days before. (TR 125, lines 18-25, TR 126, lines 1-19) 
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17. Defendant testified that the Option Agreement was typed by an 
assistant from Defendant's notes. (TR 93, lines 2-24) 
18. Defendant believes it is possible he hand-wrote "$ 144,950" on the 
draft. (TR 96, lines 21-25, TR 97, lines 1-5) 
19. However, Defendant acknowledged another possibility: that his 
assistant misread "$184,950" as $144,950. (TR 97, lines 6-20) 
20. Either way, it was plainly a "mistake" because Defendant did not sell 
any of the small-sized units for less than $184,950. (TR 97, lines 21-23) 
21. Defendant did not sell any of the units, even the large-sized units, "for 
less than the list price." (TR 98, lines 2-3) 
22. Defendant testified there was no reason for him to offer anyone a 
discount: "I had two pages of people that were calling just to get on the list in case 
somebody else couldn't buy it." (TR 98, lines 4-25) 
23. Defendant testified that none of the buyers of the small-sized units 
"dropped out." (TR 99, lines 2-14) 
24. Defendant testified he was not surprised by Plaintiffs mortgage 
commitment of $129,600 (TR 100, lines 8-22), which was faxed to Defendant after 
Plaintiff signed the Option Agreement: 
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I don't think it's my duty to find out how much people are going to 
borrow, and, you know, most of the people in the complex are paying 
cash for a half a million dollar project. So - and most of them are, 
you know - investment buyers. They have to put up 20 percent, 
which is $40,000, $50,000. But then, it's not my concern how much 
they can afford and what they can't, because I'm assuming that he 
[Plaintiff] would have to borrow the $129,000 and put the rest up in 
cash. 
TR 100, lines 24-25, TR 101, lines 1-7 
25. Unfortunately, the mistaken price in the Option Agreement was 
transferred to the REPC. (TR 104, lines 14-24) 
26. Defendant did not discover the mistake until after signing the REPC, 
at the time he was arranging for construction financing. (TR 105, lines 10-25, TR 
106, lines 1-21) 
27. Plaintiff testified that he had a discussion with Defendant about the 
difference in price some months before. (TR 44, lines 7-9) 
28. However, on cross-examination, Plaintiff admitted that in their later 
discussion, Defendant characterized the difference in price as a "mistake." (TR 59, 
lines 15-21) 
29. In fact, Plaintiff testified that at first, Defendant demanded the full 
$184,950. (TR48, lines 8-17) 
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30. Defendant's Addendum No. 02 is perfectly consistent with this 
testimony: "The total selling price referenced to on the REPC for the sum of 
$144,950 was made in error. All other units of the like were all sold for the price 
of $184,950. Therefore, it becomes necessary to adjust the selling price for this 
unit (#402)." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 6) 
31. In order to try and resolve the problem, Defendant offered to sell the 
unit to Plaintiff for a $5,000 discount. (TR 107, lines 9-25, TR 108, lines 1-4) 
32. Plaintiff refused the offer. (TR 108, lines 5-7) 
33. Defendant made the offer anyway: "I felt bad, because, you know, 
that I made the mistake. You know, but I was under the impression that it could 
have been an investment, and all I had to do, if he couldn't afford it, to give his 
$10,000 back." (TR 108, lines 8-14) 
34. As an alternative, Defendant testified that he would be willing to sell 
Plaintiff a fully-built unit for $184,950. (TR 110, lines 6-8) 
3 5. However, Defendant testified that if Plaintiff refused that, he had no 
choice but to cancel the REPC so he could sell the unit to someone else. (TR 110, 
lines 9-17) 
To show that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's 
findings on this issue, Plaintiff submits that the following is all the evidence that 
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supports the trial court's findings, almost all of which consists of Plaintiff s 
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony: 
1. Plaintiff testified that he first contacted Defendant about the 
condominium project "around Thanksgiving time, November 30th through 
December the 5th [2005]...." (TR 25, lines 2-10) 
2. Plaintiff testified that Defendant represented the sales price for the 
units "[a]nywhere from the mid 100's all the way up to - well up into the 200's I 
believe he said." (TR 25, lines 24-25, TR 26, line 1) 
3. Plaintiff testified that he expressed interest "in something on the lower 
end." (TR 26, lines 1-2) 
4. Plaintiff testified that he wanted a unit facing east "cause that's where 
the mountains are." (TR 27, lines 6-8) 
5. But Plaintiff testified that Defendant told him "well, something on 
that side you were going to be looking at 180,000's." (TR 27, lines 10-11) 
6. Plaintiff testified "well, that's not something that I could afford. I 
need to be lower than that." (TR 28, lines 11-12) 
7. Plaintiff testified that Defendant told him "he had one on the 
northwest corner, which faces out that way towards the lake, in my opinion, less of 
a view than I was for anyway, he said at $144,900." (TR 28, 12-15) 
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8. Plaintiff signed an Option Agreement dated January 9,2006 for 
$144,950. (TR 38, lines 5-25, TR 39, lines 1-2) 
9. On February 14, 2006, Plaintiff got pre-approved for a loan of 
$129,000. (TR40, lines 17-25, TR41, lines 1-13) 
10. Plaintiff faxed Defendant a copy of his mortgage credit approval letter 
"a week or so later." (TR 42, lines 4-7) 
11. At about that time, Plaintiff testified that he had a phone conversation 
with Defendant in which he explained that "with the building, you know, not even 
being - not even having started, I still have plenty of time for me to come up with 
the other $5,000 to $6,000." (TR 42, lines 24-25, TR 43, lines 1-2) 
12. Plaintiff testified that Defendant said, "that's fine." (TR 43, line 2) 
13. Plaintiff testified that in this same conversation, Defendant 
represented: "I've actually just sold one of the last ones similar to yours for 
$185,000.. ..[S]o you're doing really well. You already have equity in it." (TR 44, 
lines 7-9) 
14. A couple of months later, Plaintiff signed the REPC for $144,950. 
(TR 46, lines 5-10) (Addendum A hereto) 
14 
15. Plaintiff testified that "in early May - early or late April/early May I 
think it was, after two weeks - a couple of weeks after I'd sent back the [REPC]" 
(TR 48, lines 1-3), he had the following phone conversation with Defendant: 
[Tjhere's, you know, there is a problem. I sold you that condo too 
cheap.. ..I can't give it to you for $144,000.. ..Everyone else has [sic] 
been purchasing for $184,000, and I'm going to need to get $40,000 
more from you. I'm going to have to send you a new contract for 
$ 184,000 is what he said,.... 
TR 48, lines 8-17 
16. Plaintiff testified that in that same conversation he explained to 
Defendant he would be unable to come up with an additional $40,000. (TR 49, 
lines 12-13) 
17. He testified that he told Defendant "best case scenario, I'd probably 
be able to, you know, save $10,000 - $15,000 with the help of some friends and 
family." (TR49, lines 13-15) 
18. Plaintiff testified that Defendant stated: "[H]e'll see what he can do. 
He'll put something together and he'll fax it to me." (TR 49, lines 17-19) 
19. Plaintiff testified: 
He [Defendant] said that he was going to be able to - he gave me the 
impression that he was going to be able to work with me. When I said 
that, you know, I might be able to come up with $10,000 to $15,000, 
he said he might be able to work with me. And he would send me a 
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new agreement, but I said there was definitely no way $184,000 was 
going to work for me. I would have to - yeah, I wouldn't be able to 
purchase it. There was just no way. I wouldn't be able to save that, 
and I wouldn't be able to qualify for that. 
TR 50, lines 16-24 
20. In a subsequent phone conversation, Plaintiff testified he told 
Defendant: "[I]f I could afford $184,000,1 would have - I'd buy a house in Ogden 
for $184,000. I, you know, - 1 could get a house for that, but I didn't see myself 
spending $184,000 for a condo, not at the time anyway." (TR 52, lines 9-12) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts relevant to the issues presented for review have been stated in the 
foregoing Statement of Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court confused the concepts of contract interpretation and 
integration. The trial court found that the REPC was only partially integrated (R. 
101) when there was absolutely no dispute about it being "a fully integrated and 
binding agreement." (R. 132-33, f 11) (Addendum C hereto) On this faulty basis, 
the trial court concluded that extrinsic evidence was needed to determine the 
parties' "intent." (R. 101) However, the agreed terms of the REPC were not 
ambiguous, and the trial court was constrained to apply those terms to the parties' 
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bargain. It was error for the trial court to reform the REPC, by reading out an 
express provision (Section 1.1), in order to make it conform to the parties' 
(allegedly) unstated "intent." 
2. The trial court compounded its error by excluding relevant extrinsic 
evidence from its determination of the parties' intent. There was no question that 
the parties intended for conveyance of a fully-built condominium unit. However, 
there was a dispute about the price. The trial court excluded any evidence about 
price because it determined that provision to be unambiguous. However, the 
evidence about price was inseparable from evidence about whether the parties 
intended to convey a fully-built condominium unit. Therefore, the trial court 
ruling resulted in findings that were not supported by the evidence and clearly 
erroneous. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CONFUSED THE CONCEPTS OF 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND INTEGRATION. AS A 
RESULT, THE TRIAL COURT REFORMED AN UNAMBIGUOUS 
CONTRACT, BY READING OUT AN EXPRESS PROVISION, 
BECAUSE IT (ALLEGEDLY) DID NOT EXPRESS THE PARTIES' 
"INTENT." 
The law on this subject is exceedingly clear: 
In interpreting a contract, we look to the writing itself to 
ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract 
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provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving 
effect to all and ignoring none. 
If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law.... 
An ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies. 
WebBank v. American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, 
Htl 8-20, 54 P.3d 1139 (citing Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 
43, [^19, 48 P.3d 918 (quotations and other citations omitted) 
A perfect example of an "ambiguous" contract is the lease in Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600. The building was under construction at the 
time the parties made the lease. 2003 UT 37 at f 8 Both parties understood that the 
lessee intended to operate a health club and that the property would require 
significant interior improvements before it could be used for that purpose. Id. 
However, the lease was utterly silent on the question of who would pay for the 
improvements. Id. This was important because the cost of improvements "would 
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have consumed more than half the total rents...." Id. at f 13 This was a case of 
"missing terms," Id. at f^lO, a clear facial deficiency.4 
There is one well-recognized exception, which is important for perfectly 
expressing the trial court's considered approach to this case: "[W]e have extended 
the notion of ambiguity in contracts to include instances where, despite the lack of 
ambiguity in the terms and provisions of the contract themselves, an ambiguity 
exists as to the nature and character of the contract or transaction as a whole" 
WebBank, supra, at f 21 (citing Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. 
Larsen Bros. Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)) (emphasis added) 
However, and this is critical, the exception was created for and expressly 
limited to a certain species of cases: "Specifically in the context of whether a 
particular agreement should be considered a secured transaction for purposes of 
Article 9 of the UCC,...." WebBank, supra, at [^21 (emphasis added) There can be 
no question that the exception is strictly limited to cases involving secured 
transactions: 
We consider this case to be sufficiently similar to Colonial 
Leasing to be governed by it.... 
4
 It would be tempting to consider this case a perfect match. However, unlike this case, there was no extrinsic 
evidence on which the trial court could resolve the ambiguity. 2003 UT 37 at f 12 Furthermore, there was no 
challenge to the trial court's interpretation of the contract after finding ambiguity. Id. at 14 Finally, the case was 
actually decided on a different basis: that the contract was unenforceable for lack of mutual assent, id., which 
colored the case more than the determination of ambiguity. The cases really are quite different. 
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Colonial Leasing, much like the case at hand, involved the 
issue of the interpretation of an agreement and whether the agreement, 
depending on its proper characterization, was a security agreement 
governed by Article 9 of the UCC. Our holding in Colonial Leasing 
is consistent with the general rules for interpreting security 
agreements in that, by allowing extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties' intent as to whether the agreement was a security agreement, 
we ensured on remand that the trial court would properly focus the 
inquiry on the intent of the parties, on the substance, not on the mere 
form, of the transaction, and on the entire surrounding context of the 
transaction 
WebBank, supra, at ^[25-26 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
No one has ever argued that the REPC was a secured transaction. It most 
certainly is not. Therefore, there was no basis for departing from the normal rules 
of contract interpretation in this case. However, it is important to note that even if 
the secured transaction analysis were employed, the Court would be required to 
"view all of the provisions of the contract together" in order to determine whether 
an ambiguity existed. WebBank, supra, at }^28 
We deem this to be perfectly consistent with what was stated above ("we 
consider each contract provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward 
giving effect to all and ignoring none"). It also answers the trial court's second 
considered approach to this case: What do I do with an ambiguity? Do I not 
simply read out the ambiguous provision? 
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This question was answered by the trial court's citation of Peterson v. 
Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 48 P.3d 918 (RR. 99-100), where the Utah Supreme 
court stated there is no ambiguity unless "the interpretations contended for are 
reasonably supported by the language of the contract,...." 2002 UT 43 at f 19 
(emphasis added) In this case, there was no way to square the parties' intent to 
convey a fully-built condominium unit with the "language" of Section 1.1, which 
is something the trial court seemed to accept. (R. 173, lines 22-24) This is simply 
another way of saying that the REPC was unambiguous. 
Section 1.1 of the REPC cannot be read out of the contract. It must be read 
together with the other provisions of the contract with a view to giving it effect. In 
this regard, it is quite important that the REPC is a form instrument, which has 
been used for many years. It is not internally inconsistent. The only reason it has 
been deemed inconsistent in this case is because of the circumstances. It may be 
that the parties should have used a different form, but this is the form they used, 
and it is not ambiguous. 
The problem with the trial court's ruling started when it considered the 
REPC to be less than "fully integrated." It is clear that this was the basis for the 
trial court's ruling: 
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Accordingly, extrinsic evidence is needed to ascertain the parties' 
intent with respect to [whether the REPC required the conveyance of 
a fully-built condominium unit] only, not the contract price. 
Otherwise, the court finds that the REPC is fully integrated for the 
contract price of $144,950. 
R. 101 (Addendum B hereto) (emphasis added) 
Hopefully, we have made exceedingly clear there was no basis for this 
determination. From the beginning, the parties stipulated that the REPC was "a 
fully integrated and binding agreement." (RR. 132-33, |11) (Addendum C hereto) 
There was never any contention that the parties were looking to something other 
than the REPC to memorialize their agreement. When the trial court's ruling 
placed this in question, the findings were modified to make it clear. (Id.) 
Therefore, the trial court was constrained by the unambiguous terms of the 
REPC. In order to make the ruling that it did, it was necessary to read Section 1.1 
out of the REPC. This is what the trial court meant by the following statement: 
"Then why don't I just reform [Section] 1.1 to say in this case that the parties 
intended to have a built-out unit." (TR 173, lines 22-24) (emphasis added) There 
was an explicit understanding that the parties' contract did not provide for a "built-
out unit." 
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However, this did violence to another principle of contract interpretation: 
Parol evidence may be admissible to "clarify9' a facial ambiguity, but it is 
inadmissible "to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of an 
integrated contract,...." Union Bank v. Swenson, supra, 707 P.2d at 665 (emphasis 
added) Therefore, the trial court's ruling was impermissible even under its 
wrongful finding of partial integration. 
It is obvious that the trial court did not like the parties' agreement. (No one 
did.) However, the trial court was without legal authority to reform the instrument. 
It was the "final and complete expression of [the parties'] bargain." Eie v. St 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981) (quotation omitted) 
Therefore, the trial court should not have considered whether it correctly stated the 
parties' "intent." Parol evidence would have been admissible to "clarify" a facial 
ambiguity, Union Bank v. Swenson, supra, but it was not admissible to create an 
ambiguity where one did not exist. Either way, it was error for the trial court to 
read the (allegedly) offending provision out of the contract. The parties made the 
contract that they did, and they are required to live with it even if it does not 
perfectly express their (subjective) intent. 
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II. HAVING CONCLUDED THAT THE REPC WAS "AMBIGUOUS," 
THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
ABOUT THE PARTIES' INTENT. AS A RESULT, THE TRIAL 
COURT RULING RESULTED IN FINDINGS THAT WERE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court ruling was the product of a flawed legal analysis. However, 
it was also the product of a rigid and overly formalistic approach to the evidence. 
Once the trial court concluded that Section 1.1 was ambiguous, it disregarded any 
evidence that did not go to the question whether the parties intended for the 
conveyance of a fully-built condominium unit. There is no question that the 
parties - subjectively - intended for conveyance of a fully-built unit. But the trial 
court disregarded relevant evidence that the parties intended for conveyance of a 
fully-built unit, for the agreed price of $184,950. Therefore, the trial court ruling 
resulted in findings that were not supported by the evidence and clearly erroneous. 
It is unclear whether the trial court accepted Plaintiffs version of the events. 
The trial court merely stated that "Flores' testimony concerning the interpretation 
of the contract for a built-out unit appears reasonable'' (TR 101) (emphasis added) 
It is obvious this statement was made for the purpose of satisfying the legal 
requirement "that the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by 
the language of the contract,...." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43 at [^19 
(emphasis added) 
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However, Plaintiffs version of the events made their way into the trial 
court's "Findings of Fact" (R. 129) (Addendum C hereto), which supported the 
Order and Judgment that is appealed from in this case. (R. 139) Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the evidence underlying the findings to see if it is legally 
sufficient. 
The trial court found that "Earnshaw offered to sell Flores a small two-
bedroom condominium in the northwest corner of the proposed Earnshaw Building 
for a purchase price of $144,950.00." (R. 130, f 5) This statement is true enough 
because the $144,950 price found its way into the Option Agreement that was 
signed by the parties. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) However, it implies that Earnshaw 
intended to convey a fully-built condominium unit for $144,950, which is where 
the wheels fall off. 
The only evidence of this supposed intent was Plaintiffs unsupported and 
self-serving testimony, which was contradicted by Defendant. Plaintiffs 
testimony was also contradicted by material and undisputed evidence that Plaintiff 
was not the first person to buy one of the small-sized units, and each and every one 
of those units was sold for a minimum of $184,950. In fact, there was no evidence 
that Defendant offered a discount of the stated price for any of the units, even the 
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larger units. This is to say nothing of the fact that Defendant's Internet marketing 
clearly stated: "Unit prices start at $184,950." 
Plaintiff had the trial court believe that Defendant made a $40,000 exception 
in Plaintiffs case. However, there was never a good explanation for why 
Defendant would do this that was supported by competent evidence. 
Plaintiff has suggested (and is expected to argue) that he was one of the first 
purchasers of Defendant's development and that Defendant simply made an error 
in judgment about the marketability of the project. Plaintiff testified to a 
conversation with Defendant after the Option Agreement was signed, where 
Defendant is alleged to have stated: "I've actually just sold one of the last ones 
similar to yours for $185,000.. ..[S]o you're doing really well. You already have 
equity in it." (TR 44, lines 7-9) However, it was proven that Plaintiff was not the 
first purchaser of a small-sized unit, and that purchaser paid the same $184,950. 
(TR 125, lines 18-25, TR 126, lines 1-19) 
Plaintiff has also argued that his northwest-facing unit was worth less than 
an east-facing unit. (TR 27, lines 6-11) However, we demonstrated at trial that 
Defendant sold a unit immediately below Plaintiff for the same $184,950. (TR 95, 
lines 13-23) Finally, it is a minor point, but $185,000 is more than $184,950. If 
Defendant made the statement attributed to him by Plaintiff, it could be he was 
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referring to this small increase in price. No matter what, if Plaintiff were right 
about Defendant's alleged error in judgment, we could understand a difference of 
$5-10,000, but $40,000? 
Plaintiffs story does not hold up under close examination. The phone 
conversation referenced above occurred in "early March." (TR 43, lines 5-10) 
This was after the parties signed the Option Agreement, but before the parties 
signed the REPC. According to Plaintiff, there was "a discussion about price, and 
how [Plaintiff was] going to make up the difference and the time frame;...." (TR 
43, lines 14-20) Plaintiff characterized Defendant as "very upbeat about it. He 
said everything was going really well. I've had a lot of interest from across - he 
mentioned across the country. People have been interested in these condos, and he 
said I've actually just sold one of the last ones similar to yours for $185,000. And 
he goes, so you're doing really well. You already have equity in it." (TR 44, lines 
3-9) (emphasis added) Plaintiff could not explain why Defendant would be 
"excited" about dropping more than $40,000 in the sale to Plaintiff. (TR 57, line 
25, TR 58, lines 1-17) However, the point is what came later. 
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Plaintiff testified to a phone conversation with Defendant "in early May -
early or late April/early May,"5 which was after the REPC was signed: "He 
[Defendant] called me, and he said that there's, you know, there is a problem. I 
sold you that condo too cheap. He goes, I can't give it to you for $144,000." (TR 
48, lines 8-10) "He said, you know, some of the words that came out of his mouth 
were to the effect that he's got people lined up wanting to buy these condos. 
They're in such high demand, and he sold other ones for $184,000." (TR 59, lines 
5-14) However, this does not explain why Defendant came to this realization 
some months after the fact. Remember, Plaintiff testified to a conversation with 
Defendant in "early March," where Defendant is alleged to have represented that 
he sold "one of the last [units] similar to yours [Plaintiff] for $185,000." (TR 44, 
lines 7-8) (emphasis added) 
Defendant did not come to this realization some months after the fact. It is 
evident he did not discover the problem until some months after the fact, which is 
how he testified. This means that Defendant truly intended to sell the unit for 
$184,950. If this is the case, then the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
All the more so because the issue of price did not factor into the trial court's ruling. 
If it had, the trial court could have enforced the parties' agreement without doing 
5
 TR 47, line 1, TR 48, lines 1-3). 
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such violence to their contract. However, this option was foreclosed by the trial 
court's decision to disregard evidence of price. As a result, the trial court ruling 
must be reversed even if this Court agrees that the REPC was "ambiguous." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's counsel made the following opening statement at trial: 
There's two ways, I think, to look at this case. Two possible results, 
okay? The first is the unfortunate one. The stripped, legal language 
of this contract, despite what both of these guys say was their intent 
because apparently that contract does not reflect either one of their 
intents, and that's a fact. A, Mr. Flores, wants a built-out unit. It 
doesn't say he gets that. B, Mr. Earnshaw says I'm supposed to get 
$184,000. It doesn't say that. It says $144,000 for the shell, okay? 
And that is one possibility. 
The other is to accept the extrinsic evidence. And at the end of 
the day, conclude, if you believe that's permissible that the language 
of the contract, 1.1, even though I don't see it, was ambiguous, but it's 
fairly apparent from all of the relevant circumstances, the fact that 
everybody else paid $184,000 - that there were no discounts, and all 
of this evidence is before you - that that was the right price. That was 
the party's [sic] intent. Like I said, I don't know how to make that 
round peg go into that square hole, but that would be a way to achieve 
substantial fairness, but I think those are the only two permissible 
results in this unfortunate case consistent with the law that we have to 
follow. 
TR 22, lines 10-25, TR 23, lines 1-7 
We still think those are the only legally permissible ways to resolve this 
case. However, the trial court rejected both of them to Defendant's disadvantage. 
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Therefore, this Court is left with no choice but to reverse the trial court on both 
counts. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Memorandum Decision (R. 095) 
should be REVERSED and the Order and Judgment (R. 139) VACATED. 
DATED this ^ M ^ d a y of July, 2008. 
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC 
By Slk^dkSJhk^ 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is a legally binding contract. Utah law requires real estate licensees to use this form. Buyer and Selfer. however, may agree to alter or delete ics provisions 
or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer Seadhna J. Plores offers to purchase the Property described below and hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as 
Earnest Money, the amount of $ 10.000.00 in the form of CASH which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties 
(as defined in Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with state law. 
Received by: DAVID G. EARNSHAW on April 14. 2006 (Date) 
(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money) 
Brokerage: , Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: Lot No, 05 of Qgden Downtown Entertainment Center 
also described as: 339 East 2550 South Unit No. 402 
City of Qgden County of Weber State of Utah, Zip 84401 (the "Property"). 
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, diis sale includes the following items JfpresenrJyowned and attached^  to 
jhej^roperty: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; wateFhelitSTTJu^^ light 
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; 
window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic 
garage door opener and accompanying iransmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be 
included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: None 
1,2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale: 
1.3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale: None 
1.4 Survey. (Check applicable boxes): A survey [ ] WILL [X] WILL NOT be prepared by a licensed surveyor. 
The Survey work will be [ ] Property corners staked ( ] Boundary Survey [X] Bourdary & Improvements survey [ ] 
Other (specify) None . Responsibility for payment: [X] Buyer [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer and Seller share equally. Buyer's 
obligation to purchase under this Contract [ 1 IS [XJ IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the Survey Work. 
If yes, the terms, of the attached Survey Addendum apply. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $ 144,950.00 
2.1 Method of Payment. The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
$ 10.000.00 (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS DEPOSIT MAY 
BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$ (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2,3. Buyer will apply 
r one or more of the following loans: [X] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ ) VA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) • 
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum. " 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
[ XI SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS None 
S (c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
S N/A (d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
$ (e) Other (specify) 
$ 134.950.00 (0 Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement 
$ 144,950.00 PURCHASE PRICE. Total oflines (a) through (f) 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
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(a) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Bayer qualifying for the appIicabIeloan(s) 
referenced inn Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition." 
(b) KJ Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. 
Section 2*3 does not apply. 
23 Application for Loan. 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Settibii 24(a), Buyer shall 
apply for the Loan. "Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: (i) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the 
"Lender") the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (ii) paid all loan application fees as 
required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the-Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender. 
(b) Procedure iF Loan Application is denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
does not approve the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a 
copy to Seller. Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by 
providing written notice 10 the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2 J(b): (i) if the Notice of Loan 
Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money 
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Biyer after that date, the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller,, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy .the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 23(b) shall have no effect on the Financing 
Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to die provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be 
governed by such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [ 1 IS [X] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. This condition is refened to as the "Appraisal Condition". If the Appraisal 
Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for less than the 
Purchase Price (a uNoticc of Appraised Value**), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such written notice 
to Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a cancellation under this 
Section 2.4: (i) if die Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (ii) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by 
Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's 
exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.4 
shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section 
of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions. 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. 
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), Or on a date upon whidh Buyer and 
Seller agree in writing. "Settlement" shall occur only when all of (he following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller 
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the 
Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these 
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered ly Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office 
in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid ly Seller under these documents have 
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyershali 
each pay one-half (Vi) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in flie setdement/closing 
process. Taxes and assessments for die current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at 
Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limited to, security deposits, cleaning deposits 
and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement. Prorations set forth in this Section shall be 
made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by die partes. 
Such writing could include die settlement statement. The transaction wjll be considered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when all of die following have been completed: (i) die proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by 
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the 
office of the county recorder. The actions described h parts (j) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be cornplecedwithintour 
calendar days of Settlement. 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ 0 ] hours [ 0 ] _days after Closing; 
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[ X1 Other (specify) Funding 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
[ ] Seller's Initials [ ] Buyer's Initials 
The Listing Agent, None , represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
The Listing Broker, None_ , represents [ ] Seller [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
The Selling Agent, None , represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
The Selling Broker, None , represents ( ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent 
6. TITLE INSURANCE, Al Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance insuring 
Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b), Seller shall provide 
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Sella' Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
(b)a commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zoning code violations; and 
(e) Other (specify) 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (check applicable boxes): 
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Section 7; 
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(c) [ ] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer*s approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"); 
(d) [ ] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms and availability of homeowner's insurance 
Coverage for the Property; 
(e) [ ] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of die Property: (specify) 
[f any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, ten Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not 
apply. The items checked in die affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections.*' Unless 
Dtherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walkthrough 
inspection under Section 11. 
8.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 
24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections are 
acceptable to Buyer. 
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8«2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may, 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Sellerwith written notice of objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancelthis 
Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to SelleT regarding the Evaluatbns & Inspections, 
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Sdler shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10-2r Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted in 
Section 10. 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE J ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there are, 
die terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by diis reference: [X] Addendum No, 01 
[ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ) Lead-Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint 
Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law) [ ] Other 
(specify) 
10. SELLER WARRANTEES & REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey g>od and 
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by general wairanty deed. Buyer agrees, however, t> accept tide to the Property 
subject to the following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and 
restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to die contents of the Commitment for Tide Insurance as agreed to by Buyer 
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and net expiring 
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other 
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c)> 
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's Hens, tax liens and warrants. 
Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related 
damage to the Property shall be repaired at feller's expense; 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprhkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances ani fireplaces will 
be in working order and fit for their intended puiposes; 
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller; 
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order and 
fit for its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as diey were on 
die date of Acceptance. 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan'1 referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from the 
warranties provided by Seller under Sections J 0.1 and 10.2 above, (Check applicable boxes); A one-year Home Warranty Plan 
[ ] WILL [ ] WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home WarranLy Plan shall be 
ordered by 0 Buyer [ ] Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by { ] Buyer [ J Seller. The cost of the Home 
Warranty Plan shall not exceed $ and shall be paid for at Settlement by [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only thai the Property is "as represented," meaning that 
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the items referenced in Sections l.l, 8.4 and 10.2 (''the items") are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and 
in the warranted condition- If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair [he 
items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for die same. 
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver by 
Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of 
the following shall occur without the prior written constat of Buyer: (a) no changes in my existing leases shall be made; (b) 
no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addeitia, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the_parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between die parties. This Contract cannot be charged except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check applicable box) 
[ ] SHALL 
[ ] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation 
fails, the other procedures and remedies available under ths Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit 
any party from seeking emergency equit^le relief pending mediation, 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, in 
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Bayer upon 
demand. It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application madb by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 
2.3(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participationh 
mediation under Section IS. 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signedby 
die party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for die provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a talcirg in eminent domain* shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed, 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensbns must be 
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agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Sectbnof this 
Coniract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b) 
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the 
timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not 
be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Cain-act, except as otherwise agreed to 
in writing by such non-party. 
22- FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) 
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicate to the other party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24> CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline (Date) 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline (Date) 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline _ (Date) 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline (Date) 
(e) Appraisal Deadline __ (Date) 
(f) Settlement Deadline (Date) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If 
Seller does not accept this offer by: 5:00 [ ] AM [X] PM Mountain Time on April 14. 2006 (Date), 
this offer shall lalpse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer. 
(Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Date) 
The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date" 
&tiV*A ^ a c ^ > 5-3^ 6M fart Qg. Cbv&sA ^ hcS<l~\ 
(Buyers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) O (Zip Code) (Phone) 
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ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER^URJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
5 4 ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions 
specified above. 
[X] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Accejtance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO. Ql 
April 14. 2006 8:45 A.M. 
(Seller's Signature 
David G. Earashaw 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) 
[ ] REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
-1774-EamshawLn. Salt Lake City, UT 34116 801-898-55_42 
(Zip Code) (Phone) 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (Fill in applicable 
section below.) 
\. I acknowl a final copy of the foregoiig Contract bearing all signatures; 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) 
Seller's Signature) (Date) (Seller's Signature) (Date) 
L I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ ] faxed [ ] mailed [ ] hand 
lelivered on ___ , (Date), postage prepaid, to the [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer. 
lent/Delivered by (specify) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES ANP SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF 
THIS FORM. 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Seadhna J. Flores, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
David G. Earnshaw, 
Defendant. 
Memorandum Decision 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Case No. 060905957 
Plaintiff Seadhna J. Flores ("Flores") seeks specific performance under a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract ("REPC"), compelling Defendant David G. Earnshaw ("Earnshaw") to sell to 
him a condominium for the contract price of $144,950. 
Trial occurred on September 21, 2007. Following an opportunity to submit post-trial 
memoranda, counsel submitted their memoranda to the court on October 5 and 9, 2007, and the 
matter for decision. 
The issues before the court are (1) whether the contract, as written, is for a condominium 
"shell," namely, a unit not built out with electricity, plumbing, fixtures, or improvements of any 
kind for the purchase price of $144,950; (2) whether the court should admit extrinsic evidence in 
interpreting the parties' contract; and, if so, (3) whether Flores is entitled to a built-out unit for 
$144,950; or (4) whether he is entitled to a built-out unit for an increased price of $184,950. 
Having considered counsels' pre- and post-trial memoranda and the trial evidence, the 
court finds and rules in favor of Flores, that he is entitled to a built-out unit for the contract price 
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In recent years, Ogden City razed the Ogden City Mall that was situated north and south 
between 22nd and 24th Streets and east and west between Washington Boulevard and Grant 
Avenue in Ogden City. In place of the mall, the city has been selling the real estate for the 
development of a large entertainment center, office buildings, retail businesses, and residential 
units. Earnshaw proposed to Ogden City the construction of the Earnshaw Building, a six-story 
building, consisting of offices on the main floor and residential condominium units on the 
remaining floors. In anticipation of approval of the Earnshaw Building, Earnshaw began 
advertising the sale of the residential condominium units on the Internet and by a large sign on 
the side of a semi-trailer parked on the proposed site. 
Flores expressed interest in buying a condominium to Earnshaw in December 2005. 
Following several negotiations in late December, Earnshaw offered to sell to Flores a small, two-
bedroom condominium in the northwest corner of the proposed Earnshaw Building for the 
purchase price of $144,950. In doing so. Earnshaw assured Flores that the proposed unit would 
be finished in a "high standard—carpet, tile, cabinets." 
On January 9, 2006, Earnshaw sent to Flores by fax an option agreement for Flores to 
purchase the condominium for $144,950. The option agreement preceded the real estate purchase 
contract because, as of January 2006, Earnshaw had not yet finalized his purchase of the real 
estate from Ogden City on which to build his building. In order for Flores to exercise the option, 
thus reserving the unit he had selected, the option agreement required him to remit $10,000 to 
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Earnshaw, which would eventually be applied to the purchase price. Flores timely accepted the 
option and remitted the required deposit. 
After Earnshaw closed on the real estate with Ogden City in March 2006, he forwarded to 
Flores on April 9, 2006, a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") for the sale and purchase of the 
condominium, described in the agreement as "Lot no. 5 of Ogden Downtown Entertainment 
Center, 339 East 2550 South, Unit no. 402." Under the financial terms of the agreement, Flores 
agreed to pay Earnshaw $144,950, less the $10,000 previously paid when Flores exercised the 
option. Flores accepted the offer on April 21, 2006, and Earnshaw signed the REPC on May 1, 
2006, thus creating a binding agreement. 
In early May 2006, Earnshaw called Flores, indicating that he had sold the condominium 
too cheaply. Earnshaw represented that he had sold all of the units in the building, that all other 
buyers of similarly-sized units had paid $184,950, and that he could not afford to sell the one to 
Flores for less. 
Earnshaw later sent a faxed addendum to the REPC to Flores to correct the purchase 
price. The addendum states: "The total selling price referenced to on the REPC for the sum of 
$144,950 was made in error. All other units of the like were sold for the price of $184,950. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to adjust the selling price for this unit (#402)." (PL's Ex. 6 
(emphasis added).) Earnshaw further stated in the addendum that the purchase price shall be 
$179,950, less the $10,000 deposit as earnest money to be applied at closing. Earnshaw then gave 
Flores 12 days to accept the addendum or forfeit his deposit, at which time Earnshaw would 
consider their agreement void. 
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At trial, Earnshaw contended that, contrary to Flores' testimony, the parties always 
discussed a purchase price of $184,950. He stated that he had either made a scrivener's error or 
his secretary had made an error in reading his hand-written notes as she prepared the option 
agreement. Later, when he closed on the property with Ogden City in March 2006, Earnshaw 
directed his secretary to prepare the REPC using the purchase price reflected in the option 
agreement because the purchase price varied, depending on the size and location of the unit in the 
building. Thus, Earnshaw maintains that his secretary perpetuated an error from the option 
agreement to the REPC, which he never saw in either document until later in May 2006. 
Earnshaw testified that he intended to provide a fully built-out condominium unit to 
Flores, but only for $184,950. Nonetheless, since Flores seeks to enforce the price of $144,950, 
as written in the contract, then Earnshaw, too, seeks to enforce the express terms of the REPC. 
Earnshaw contends that paragraph 1.1, as written, requires him to build only a "shell" for Flores 
because, unless such things as electricity, plumbing, fixtures, etc., were attached to the property 
when the parties executed their agreement, they are not included in the purchase price. Paragraph 
1.1 reads as follows: 
Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items 
if presently owned and attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in 
appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and 
rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; window blinds; 
awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently 
affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and accompanying 
transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also 
included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties 
as to title: None. 
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(PL's Ex. 4 H 1.1 (emphasis added).) 
The facts are undisputed that, at the time the parties contracted, none of the items 
referenced in paragraph 1.1 could have been attached to the property because neither unit no. 402 
existed or Earnshaw's condominium building had been built. Nonetheless, Earnshaw stands 
willing to provide to Flores the "features" of a built-out unit, contained in Earnshaw's marketing 
materials but not referenced in the REPC, if Flores will pay the $184,950 that others are paying. 
On July 3, 2006, Flores filed a notice of a claim of interest against the property. In 
response, Earnshaw demanded on July 20,2006, that the notice of claim be withdrawn as a 
wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). Flores released his claim of interest on August 
24, 2006, but recorded a notice of lis pendens on October 19,2006, after filing his complaint. On 
December 14, 2006, the notice of lis pendens was subordinated to a lien from First Community 
Bank trust deed. On February 15, 2007, Earnshaw requested that the lis pendens be released. 
Flores refused on February 21, 2007. Later Earnshaw filed an answer to Flores' complaint and a 
counterclaim for wrongful lien. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Real Estate Purchase Contract 
The intention of the parties to the contract is controlling in construing the REPC. 
Normally, "[i]f the language of the contract is unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be 
determined as a matter of law based on the language of the agreement.... A contract provision is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain 
meanings of terms, missing terms or other facial deficiencies.5 In determining whether a contract 
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is ambiguous[,] the court is not bound to consider only the language of the contract. 'Any 
relevant evidence must be considered5 so that the court 'can place itself in the same situation the 
parties found themselves at the time of contracting. The only evidence relevant to that inquiry is 
evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the [agreement]."5 Peterson v. 
Sunhder Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 925 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). 
The Peterson court went on to say, "If after considering such evidence the court 
determines that the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous terms. Conversely, if after 
considering such evidence, the court determines that the language of the contract is not 
ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of the 
contract.55 Id. (quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995)). 
"Questions of whether a contract is ambiguous because of uncertain meaning of terms, 
missing terms, or facial deficiencies are questions of law that must be determined by the court 
before parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to clarify the contractual intent of the parties. 
Questions of intent as detennined by extrinsic evidence ate questions of fact to be decided by the 
trier of fact... ." Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990). 
In this case, Earnshaw used a REPC that is normally used in the sale and purchase of an 
existing piece of improved real estate. Hence, a provision defining items included in the sale "if 
presently owned and attached to the property55 clarifies what is usually included in the sale. 
However, Earnshaw used a REPC when no physical structure or improved real estate existed. In 
fact, no discernible street address, as referenced in paragraph 1, even existed except, perhaps, in a 
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plat in the county recorder's office. Therefore, placing the parties in the position they found 
themselves when they executed the contract, the court concludes that paragraph 1.1, referencing 
items included in the sale of the property "if presently owned and attached to the property," 
creates an uncertain meaning of the parties' intent, a facial deficiency, and an impression that 
other terms are missing. Moreover, Flores' testimony concerning the interpretation of the 
contract for a built-out unit appears reasonable. Accordingly, the court concludes that the 
contract is ambiguous about the extent to which the condominium unit no. 402 would be built 
out. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence is needed to ascertain the parties' intent with respect to that 
issue only, not the contract price. Otherwise, the court finds that the REPC is fully integrated for 
the contract price of $144,950. 
Having concluded that the contract is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
determine the parties' intent to which unit no. 402 would be built, the court finds, based on the 
parties' testimonies, that there is no dispute that both parties intended a built-out unit. 
In summary of this point, Earnshaw shall build out Flores' condominium, Unit no. 402, 
according to Earnshaw's marketing materials that includes a "features" page. In making this 
order, the court is cognizant that Flores was uncertain of whether the "features" page was part of 
Earnshaw's Internet advertising when he evaluated Earnshaw's offer to the public and signed the 
REPC. The court finds later, at the direction of his lawyer in May 2006, Flores made a copy of 
Earnshaw's Web-page advertising that did include a features page. Since Earnshaw sold all the 
condominium units within less than 30 days in January 2006, is seems reasonable for the court to 
find, and it so finds, that all buyers, including Flores, relied on the features page of Earnshaw's 
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marketing materials in purchasing their condominium units. Moreover, Earnshaw never denied 
that the features page was part of his web page from the inception of his advertising. 
Nonetheless, if, on appeal, the court of appeals concludes that the trial court has indulged in 
impermissible speculation in making the foregoing finding, then, alternatively, Earnshaw shall 
build out Unit no. 402 commensurate with the features and amenities of other similarly-sized 
units in the building because Earnshaw promised a "fully built unit" of "high standard—carpet, 
tile, cabinets," unless the buyers of similarly-sized units negotiated above the purchase price of 
$184,950 for upgrades in features, fixtures, or other amenities. 
II. Lis Pendens 
Following Earnshaw's demand for more money after discovering his error in the REPC, 
Flores filed a notice of a claim of interest against the property. In response, Earnshaw demanded 
that the notice of claim be withdrawn as a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). 
Complying, Flores released his claim of interest but filed suit for specific performance of the 
contract and recorded a notice of lis pendens on October 19, 2006. On February 15, 2007, 
Earnshaw requested that the lis pendens be released, but Flores refused. 
In his counterclaim, Earnshaw7 asserts that Flores' lis pendens is a wrongful lien under 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). Flores contends, however, that § 38-9-2(2) authorizes an exemption 
to the Wrongful Lien Act for a lis pendens: "The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a 
person from filing a lis pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief 
permitted by law." Section 78-40-2 provides: "In any action affecting the title to, or the right of 
possession of, real property the plaintiff... may file for record with the recorder of the county in 
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which the property . . . is situated a notice of the pendency of the action . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2. 
Repudiating Flores' claim of exemption, Earnshaw argues that "this action does not affect 
the title to, or the right of possession of, real property." In support of his argument, Earnshaw 
offers as authority Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), which he contends 
stands for the proposition "that a real estate purchase contract is nothing more than an agreement 
that the owner will grant to the buyer an interest in real property at some future time. In other 
words, such an agreement 'does not purport to convey an interest in land, but is nothing more 
than a promise to do so at a later time.'" (Def.'s Supplemental Trial Br. p. 10 (quoting Russell, 
999P.2datl248).) 
Earnshaw misapprehends the analysis and holding of Russell. That case involved a 
purchase and development agreement, which by its terms, the "defendants [the party filing the 
notice of lis pendens] did not have an interest in land, but an agreement that plaintiffs will grant 
to defendants an interest in [the subject property] at some future time." Id. In Russell, the 
defendants argued that they had at least an equitable interest in [the property], similar to a buyer's 
interest in a real estate purchase contract. Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals said: 
"[TJhe Agreement here is not analogous to a real estate contract in that the Agreement does not 
purport to convey an interest in property, but contains a qualified promise to do so at a later time. 
Once parties have entered into a binding and enforceable land sale contract, the buyer's interest 
in the contract is said to be real property and the seller's retained interest is characterized as 
personal property. Accordingly, we reject this argument." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis 
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added). 
The court holds in this case that the REPC is an executory contract for the sale and 
purchase of real property, in which Flores has an equitable interest in the real property under the 
doctrine of equitable conversion. "Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, once parties have 
entered into a binding and enforceable land sale contract, the buyer's interest in the contract is 
said to be real property and the seller's retained interest is characterized as personal property." 
Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Continuing its analysis, the 
court of appeals in Cannefax relied on Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), where 
Justice Stewart stated: "Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, a vendee under a uniform 
real estate contract obtains an equitable interest in the land itself, even though the vendor retains 
the legal title. The vendee is said to convert the monetary interest that he has in the property to an 
interest in real estate so that he may invoke the powers of an equity court to compel specific 
performance of the real estate contract." Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 n.5. The court further said in 
Butler, "as a general proposition, the vendee is treated as the owner of the land." Id. at 1254. 
Therefore, because Flores has an equitable interest in the condominium unit no. 402, 
under his REPC. he had authority under section 78-40-2 to file a lis pendens as part of "an action 
affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, [the] real property" to give constructive notice 
to other potential buyers of his property interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Flores is entitled to an judgment of specific performance, ordering Eamshaw to build out 
Flores' condominium, Unit no. 402, consistent with the marketing materials used to sell the 
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condominium units in the Earnshaw Building. He shall build out the unit commensurate with the 
features and amenities of other similarly-sized units in the building, unless the buyers of those 
units negotiated above the purchase price of $184,950 for upgrades. 
Flores is entitled to a judgment dismissing Earnshaw's counterclaim of a wrongful lien. 
Flores validly filed a notice of lis pendens. 
Under paragraph 17 of the REPC, Flores is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs 
as the prevailing party. He may also have reasonable attorney fees for his successful defense of 
Earnshaw's claim of a wrongful lien, pursuant to Utah Code Ami. § 38-9-7(5)(c). Mr. Olmstead 
may submit to Mr. Dal ton an affidavit for fees and a memorandum of costs. Mr. Dalton has 10 
days after service to object. In case of an objection, the court will reopen this case for an 
evidentiary hearing to address fees and costs. 
Dated this day of October, 2007. 
Hit 
Michael D. Lyon, Judge 
^ 
Memorandum Decision 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 2 5 day of October, 2007,1 sent a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ruling to counsel as follows: 
Michael F. Olmstead 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2650 Washington, Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorney for Defendant 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
ADDENDUM C 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD [2455] 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 625-0960 
Facsimile (801)621-0035 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEADHNA J. FLORES, ) FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 060905957 
DAVID G. EARNSHAW, ) 
Defendant. ) Judge MICHAEL D. LYON 
This matter having come on for a Bench Trial this 21st day of September, 2007, before the 
Honorable MICHAEL D. LYON, District Court Judge; and the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
with his counsel of record, MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD, Esquire; and the Defendant appearing in 
person and with his counsel of record, DONALD L. DALTON, Esquire; and both parties having 
testified in support of their cause; and both sides having submitted various exhibits in support of 
their cause; and each party, through their counsel of record, having made oral arguments to the Court 
at the close of evidence; and each party, through their respective counsel, having submitted Post-
Trial Memoranda at the request of the Court; and the Court having considered the matter; and, being 
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duly advised, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In recent years, Ogden City razed the Ogden City Mall that was situated north and 
south between 22nd and 24th Streets and east and west between Washington Boulevard and Grant 
Avenue in Ogden City. 
2. In place of the mall, the city had been selling real estate for the development of a 
large entertainment center, office buildings, retail business and residential units. 
3. Defendant DAVID G. EARNSHAW ("Eamshaw") proposed to Ogden City and was 
approved for the construction of the Eamshaw Building, a six-story development consisting of 
offices on the main floor and residential condominium units on the remaining floors. 
4. In anticipation of approval of the Eamshaw Building, Eamshaw began advertising 
for the sale of residential condominium units, by way of the Internet and by a large sign on the side 
of a semi-trailer parked on the proposed site. 
5. Plaintiff SEADHNA J. FLORES ("Flores") expressed interest in buying a 
condominium in a conversation with Eamshaw in December 2005 and, following several 
negotiations thereafter in late December, Eamshaw offered to sell Flores a small two-bedroom 
condominium in the northwest comer of the proposed Eamshaw Building for a purchase price of 
$144,950.00. In doing so, Eamshaw assured Flores that the proposed unit would be finished in a 
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"high standard - carpet, tile, cabinets". 
6. On January 9,2006, Eamshaw sent to Flores, by fax, an Option Agreement for Flores 
to purchase the condominium for the purchase price of $144,950.00. This agreement preceded a 
later Real Estate Purchase Contract because, as of January 2006, Eamshaw had not yet finalized his 
acquisition of the real estate from Ogden City on which to build his building. 
7. In order for Flores to exercise this option, thus reserving the unit he had selected, the 
Option Agreement required him to remit $10,000.00 to Eamshaw, which deposit would eventually 
be applied against the purchase price. 
8. Flores timely accepted the terms of the Option Agreement by executing the same and 
remitted to Eamshaw the required deposit. 
9. After Eamshaw closed on the real estate with Ogden City in March 2006, he 
forwarded to Flores, on April 9, 2006, a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") for the sale and 
purchase of a residential condominium unit, described in the agreement as "Lot No. 5 of Ogden 
Downtown Entertainment Center, 339 East 2550 South, Unit No. 402." 
10. Under the financial terms of this agreement, Flores agreed to pay Eamshaw 
$144,950.00, less the $10,000.00 previously paid when Flores had exercised the earlier Option 
Agreement. 
11. Flores signed and accepted the offer, as contained in the REPC, on April 21, 2006, 
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and Earnshaw signed the same on May 1, 2006, thus, creating a fully integrated and binding 
agreement. 
12. In early May 2006, Earnshaw called Flores indicating to Flores that he had sold the 
condominium too cheaply, that he had sold all other units in the building of similar size for 
$184,950.00, and he could not afford to sell the one to Flores for any less. 
13. Earnshaw later sent a faxed Addendum to the REPC to Flores in an effort to correct 
and adjust the purchase price. The Addendum states: 
"The total selling price referenced on the REPC for the sum of $144,950.00 was 
made in error. All other units of the like were sold for the price of$ 184,950.00. Therefore, 
it becomes necessary to adjust the selling price for the unit (No. 402)." 
[Plaintiffs Exhibit "6".] [Emphasis added.] 
Earnshaw further stated in the Addendum that the purchase price shall be $ 179,950.00, less 
the $10,000.00 deposit earnest money to be applied at closing. 
14. Earnshaw gave Flores twelve (12) days to accept this Addendum or forfeit his 
deposit, at which time Earnshaw would consider their agreement void. Flores declined. 
15. At Trial, Earnshaw contended, contrary to Flores' testimony, that the parties always 
discussed a purchase price of $184,950.00. He stated that the lower figure contained in the Option 
Agreement and later in the REPC resulted either from his scrivener's error and/or because of his 
secretary's error in transcribing his manual numbers to the Option Agreement and later to the REPC. 
16. Earnshaw testified that it was always his intention to provide a fully built-out 
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condominium unit to Flores but only for the price of $ 184,950.00 but, since Flores seeks to enforce 
the price of $144,950.00 as written in the contract, then Earnshaw, too, seeks to enforce the express 
terms of the REPC. 
17. Earnshaw contends that paragraph 1.1 of the REPC, as written, requires him to build 
only a "shell" for Flores because, unless such things as electricity, plumbing, fixtures, etc., were 
attached to the property when the parties executed their agreement, they are not included in the 
purchase price. Paragraph 1.1 reads as follows: 
"Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if 
presently owned and attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures 
and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; 
bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and 
windows; window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; 
permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); 
fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be included in this sale and 
conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: None." [Emphasis added.] 
18. The facts are undisputed that, at the time the parties contracted, none of the items 
referenced in paragraph 1.1 could have been attached to the property, because neither Unit No. 402 
existed, nor had any part of Earnshaw's condominium building been constructed. 
19. It is also undisputed that Earnshaw used a REPC that is normally used in the sale and 
purchase of an existing piece of improved real estate, despite the fact that, at that time, no physical 
structure or improved real estate then existed. 
20. Earnshaw stands willing, according to his testimony, to provide to Flores all of the 
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features of a built-out unit, as contained in Earnshaw's marketing materials, but not referenced in 
the REPC, but only if Flores will pay $184,950.00 that others are paying. 
21. On July 3, 2006, Flores recorded a Notice of Claim of Interest against the property. 
22. In response, on July 20, 2006, Earnshaw demanded that the Notice of Claim of 
Interest be withdrawn, claiming it was a wrongful lien under Utah Code Annotated, §38-9-1(6). 
23. Thereafter, Flores released his Notice of Claim of Interest on August 24,2006, but, 
thereafter, recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on October 19,2006, after filing his Complaint in this 
matter. 
24. On December 14,2006, Plaintiff s Notice of Lis Pendens was subordinated to a Trust 
Deed of First Community Bank. 
25. On February 15,2007, Earnshaw requested from Flores that his Notice of Lis 
Pendens be released, but Flores refused on February 21, 2007. 
26. As a result, Earnshaw later filed an Answer to Flores' Complaint and a separate 
Counterclaim against Flores, claiming the recorded Notice of Claim of Interest and Notice of Lis 
Pendens amounted to a wrongful lien. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that paragraph 1.1 of the REPC, referencing items included in 
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the sale of the property "if presently owned and attached to the Property", creates an uncertain 
meaning of the parties' intent, a facial deficiency and an impression that other terms are missing. 
2. The Court concludes that Flores' testimony concerning his interpretation of the 
contract for a built-out unit appears reasonable and, in fact, on that matter both parties are in 
agreement. 
3. The Court concludes that the contract is ambiguous with regard to the extent to 
which the condominium, Unit No. 402, would be built-out. 
4. The Court concludes that extrinsic evidence is needed and is admissible to ascertain 
the parties' intent with respect to that issue only and not as to contract price. 
5. The Court finds and concludes that the ambiguity in the contract, with regard to the 
parties' intent to which Unit No. 402 would be built, is resolved by their testimonies, wherein they 
both testified there is no dispute that what was intended was a built-out unit. 
6. Having concluded that the contract is ambiguous, with regard to the parties' intent 
as to the extent to which Unit No. 402 would be built, and that extrinsic evidence is therefore 
admissible to determine said intent, the Court finds, based upon the parties' separate testimony, that 
there is no dispute on that matter, and that each of the parties intended a built-out unit. 
7. The Court concludes that the REPC is an executory contract for the sale and purchase 
of real property and, under said contract, Flores had an equitable interest in the real property under 
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the doctrine of equitable conversion. 
8. Because Flores had a property interest in the nature of an equitable interest in 
condominium Unit No. 402 under the REPC, he had authority under Utah Code Annotated, §78-40-
2, to record a Lis Pendens as part of "an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of the 
real property" and to give constructive notice to other potential buyers of Flores' property interest. 
9. Flores is entitled to a Judgment of specific performance against Earnshaw at the 
contract price of $144,950.00, and Earnshaw should build out Flores' condominium, Unit No. 402, 
consistent with the marketing materials used to sell other condominium units in the Earnshaw 
Building. Earnshaw should build out Unit No. 402 commensurate with the features and amenities 
of other similarly-sized units in the building, unless the buyers of those other units have negotiated 
above the purchase price of $ 184,950.00 for upgrades. 
10. Earnshaw' s Counterclaim of wrongful lien should be dismissed, as Flores had validly 
filed and recorded his Notice of Lis Pendens. 
11. Under paragraph 17 of the REPC and under Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-56.5, 
Flores is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Flores is also entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees for his successful defense of Earnshaw's claim of wrongful lien, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, §38-9-7(5)(c). 
12. Based upon counsel's Affidavit in support of Attorney's Fees and Costs, Flores is 
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entitled to Judgment, as and for attorney's fees and costs, in the amount of $9,347.00. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED and signed this day of , 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL D. LYON, District Court Judge 
Entered: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DONALD L. DALTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Ogden Downtown Entertainment Center 
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• Central Air 
• Oversized Bedrooms 
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Warranty Program 
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• Telephone Jacks -
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• Raised Panel Cabinets 
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• Custom Kitchen 
• Kitchen Disposal 
• Maytag Dishwasher 
• Maytag Range with 
Self Cleaning Oven 
Energy Efficiency 
Package 
• Forced Air Heating 
and Cooling 
• Insulated Steel Entry Door 
• R-38 Ceiling Insulation 
• R-13 Total Wall Composite 
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Plan A Plan B Plan C 
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view unit plan 
• 2 Bedrooms 
• Multi-purpose room 
• Kitchen Dining Room 
• Family Room 
• 2 Bathrooms 
•2165 sq.ft. 
Click Av»v lo 
War unit pUih 
• 2 Bedrooms 
• Living Room 
• Dining Room 
• Kitchen 
• 2 Bathrooms 
• 1593 sq.ft. 
('ffck here to 
view una plan 
To view a rendering ofbit tiding floor plan 3 ci 4, click here. To view a rendering o 
floor plan i ctf 6 click her*-. Renderings are meant to show position of units only. P 
that floors 3 & 4 are designated for Plan C, while floors 5 & 6 are designated for PI 
Unit prices start at $ 184,950. 
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